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Big data and the reference class problem: What can we legitimately 
infer about individuals? 
 
Catherine Greene 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Big data increasingly enables prediction of the behaviour and characteristics of 
individuals. This is ethically concerning on privacy grounds. However, this article 
discusses other reasons for concern. These predictions usually rely on 
generalisations about what certain sorts of people tend to do. Generalisations of this 
sort are often under scrutiny in legal cases, where, for example, lawyers argue that 
people with prior convictions are more likely to be guilty of the crime they are 
currently on trial for. This article applies criteria for distinguishing acceptable from 
unacceptable generalisations in legal cases to a number of big data examples. It 
argues that these criteria are helpful, and highlight three issues that should be taken 
into account when deciding whether predictions about individuals are ethical. 
 
Keywords: Big data, ethics, generalisation, reference class, target class. 
 
 
Big data allows us to characterise, and predict, the behaviour of groups of people. 
However, increasingly, big data also makes it possible to make predictions about 
individuals. Recent examples include targeting surveillance at streets, gangs, or 
individuals who are statistically more likely to commit a crime (Zwitter, 2014), and 
prediction of individual’s pregnancy status by Target, before these individuals had 
announced their pregnancies. (Crawford and Schultz, 2014). Crawford and Schultz 
argue that such uses of data can cause “predictive privacy harms” (2014, 93) and 
argue that harms resulting from predictive privacy are not satisfactorily covered by 
existing data privacy laws, primarily because, as in the Target example, the company 
had never collected any data that showed that a particular customer was pregnant, 
but predicted this information from aggregate data. Their suggested remedy is to 
institute a procedural policy to mitigate harms. 
This article makes a different proposal by challenging the ethical status of 
predictions about individuals which are based on their membership of a reference 
class. Drawing on literature discussing the use of reference class data in legal cases 
(Dahlman 2017) it argues that users of big data have an obligation to analyse 
reference classes in detail before ethically permissible inferences can be made 
about individuals. This article discusses four examples, the first is an imaginary one 
inspired by the film Minority Report, the second example predicts the performance of 
juvenile criminals in rehabilitations programs, the third predicts future health 
conditions, and the fourth predicts income levels based on social media posts. This 
article argues that the ethical status of these prediction can be questioned even 
before privacy, or even discriminatory issues, are raised.  
The argument begins by demonstrating that generalisations tie reference 
classes to target classes. In other words, that a generalisation of the form ‘people 
who live in a deprived neighbourhood are more likely to commit crimes’ underpins 
the belief that a person belonging to the relevant reference classes in likely to 
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behave in a certain way. Dahlman proposes eight questions to assess 
generalisations. Whether the generalisation is true or false, whether the 
generalisation is robust, whether the generalisation triggers bias, whether the 
reference class is heterogeneous or homogeneous, whether there is a risk that the 
generalisation, if accepted, will be overused or overestimated, whether the 
generalisation is discriminating, and whether the generalisation will put people in the 
reference class at an unfair advantage (Dahlman, 2017, pg. 98). When these are 
applied to the four examples they allow us to differentiate the ethical status of 
different reference class data. The article concludes that researchers seeking to 
make predictions about individuals using big data have an ethical obligation to 
assess the quality of the data they are using by paying attention to the truth and 
robustness of these generalisations. 
 
 
Predictions about individuals 
 
The collection of large amounts of data increasingly enables companies and 
governments to make predictions about individuals. In many cases, these predictions 
are based on large data sets, which make predictions based on what other, similar, 
people did in similar circumstances. Additionally, much of the information on which 
such predictions are made is not, obviously, information that people want to keep 
private.  
Perry et al. cite research suggesting that short term negative life events can 
increase criminal activity. These life changes include losing a job, drug or alcohol 
problems, fighting with a spouse or partner. (2013, pg. 91). The predictions about 
individuals were based on their similarity to offenders whose history prior to their 
criminal activity was known. Crawford and Schultz note that such predictions about 
individuals are enabled through the aggregation of publicly available information.  
Big Data’s ability to discriminate while manoeuvring around privacy 
regulations comes from its methodology. Not only can massive amounts of online 
behaviour be collected and assessed to compute the probabilities of an individual’s 
particular demographic characteristic, but that predictive analysis can also become a 
form of PII (personally identifiable information) itself. Moreover, this process can 
predict highly intimate information, even if none of the individual pieces of data could 
be defined as PII. Although these predictive processes may generate an inaccurate 
characterization, such processes nevertheless create a model of possible personal 
information and associate it with an individual. (2014, pg. 101)  
There are two possible responses to such predictions. The first is to expand 
existing privacy regulations; the second is to implement an ethical framework for 
making predictions about individuals that is not tied to privacy. The advantage of the 
second approach is that it prevents users of data assuming that ‘anything goes’ once 
they have satisfied privacy requirements. This paper will argue for the second 
approach, while noting that this needs to be underpinned by stringent privacy 
regulation. The following section presents four examples of predictions about 
individuals that will be discussed in the remainder of the paper. 
 
1. Predicting future criminals 
This example is hypothetical, but gets at the heart of many concerns about making 
predictions about individuals, partly because of the popular appeal of the film 
Minority Report. In this example, future criminality is predicted on a basis of factors 
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including employment status, living in deprived neighbourhoods, past convictions, 
educational level, and being male. Zwitter comments that, “While the future might not 
be as bad as depicted in the movie, ‘predictive policing’ is already a fact in Los 
Angeles, where Big Data analytics point to certain streets, gangs or individuals, who 
are more likely to commit a crime, in order to have them subjected to extra 
surveillance.” (2014, pg. 4). 
 
2. Predicting juvenile reoffending 
Perry et al. describe a number of examples, including the prediction of reoffending by 
juvenile criminals. The Florida Department of Juvenile Justice’s Bureau of Research 
and Planning manages the Juvenile Justice Information System (JJIS). This system 
collates the criminal histories of more than 1 million juvenile criminals, and is used to 
predict the success of juveniles placed in rehabilitation programs. In 2007, the 
Department piloted a statistical profiling system to predict the juvenile criminal 
behaviour of 85,000 youths and assign them to risk specific rehabilitation programs 
in an attempt to reduce recidivism. The youths were assigned to specific programs 
based on the experience assigning other, similar youths to such programs in the 
past. These programs included placement with sponsor families, community 
members, educational opportunities, disciplinary help and vocational training. Perry 
et al note that the programme has not been scientifically tested, but six months after 
the initiation of the programme, 93% of the youths remained arrest-free (2013, pg. 
109-110). 
 
3. Predicting future health conditions 
Ding et al. (2016) have developed an algorithm for predicting individuals’ future 
health conditions using data from insured inpatients in China. The aim of these 
predictions is to intervene early to reduce the incidence of serious disease. The 
variables collected included demographic information such as age, gender, rural vs 
urban address etc, and medical information including costs associated with the 
hospital stay, the diseases suffered from, and length of hospital stay. They used a 
training set to calibrate the model and then potential diseases a particular patient 
would get in the future was predicted. They note that, “if patients have several 
diseases in common, they are considered more similar than others. Among similar 
patients, one’s condition can always be taken to evaluate another’s. But if patients 
share some common diseases such as influenza, they should not be taken as 
similar.” (2016, pg. 759). 
 
4. Predicting income 
Matz et al. develop a model to predict individuals’ income levels from Facebook 
profiles. They note that information about peoples’ income is useful for marketing 
and recruitment. However, it is considered private, and most of us are unwilling to 
share it. Matz et al. show that income is predictable from ‘likes’ and status updates 
on Facebook. Their analysis suggests that the ‘likes’ of high and low socio-economic 
status individuals varies markedly- those of high income individuals refer to 
expensive travel and retail brands, while those of low income individuals refer to 
luxury in a more generalised way. They also found differences in the use of language 
in status updates. They do note that approximately 75% of the variance in income 
remained unexplained by their model, their model was accurate enough to be useful 
for marketing purposes. The model was, unsurprisingly, better at predicting income 
levels at the extremes, rather than distinguishing between middle income levels. 
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Privacy harms 
 
The usual way to approach such predictions is to argue that privacy has been 
violated. Recent examples include Crawford & Schultz (2014), who argue for a 
“procedural data due process” (2014, pg. 93). They note that by collating publicly 
available information, we can predict other data about individuals. The predicted data 
can be data we would normally consider private. This is the case with the Facebook 
example above. They note that federal regulations prohibit discrimination in access 
to credit, but by analysing online activity, such as ‘liking’ certain status updates loan 
companies are able to target people likely to have particular credit profiles. They 
describe this as the creation of “surrogate” data (2014, pg. 99). Companies doing 
this are able to circumvent existing privacy regulations because, although it is 
possible to predict highly sensitive information, none of the individual pieces of 
information on which such predictions are based are PII. Furthermore, in advance of 
making predictions, it is impossible to know which data will be critical. 
 Crawford and Schultz propose regulating “the fairness of Big Data’s analytical 
processes with regard to how they use personal data (or metadata derived from or 
associated with personal data)” (2014, pg. 109). For example, if a hospital patient is 
judged at high risk of a particular medical condition, and is refused health insurance 
on that basis, that patient would have a data due process right with regard to that 
decision. The patient should have access to a due process hearing, where they can 
present evidence of the harm the decision caused them. They note that, over time, 
judicial and legal oversight would make such tribunals more efficient. Their approach 
also requires those who use big data to disclose publicly the types of predictions 
they attempt, the general sources of data upon which they draw, and make this 
transparent to the people whose data may be collected. These disclosures should 
provide access to an audit trail created in the predictive process. Once this 
disclosure has been made, the people affected should have access to a hearing, 
where the fairness of the predictive process can be challenged.  
 The following section seeks to extend this approach, by providing criteria 
which allow users of big data to assess the ethical status of predictions they are 
seeking to make before they cause actual harms. The first step is to outline the 
structure of predictions about individuals. 
 Predictions about individuals are made on the basis of membership of 
reference classes. Big data algorithms find correlations in large data sets. For 
example, a data set of purchasing history at a supermarket might find that people 
who buy a particular brand of shampoo go on to buy a certain brand of hairbrush, 
with a certain probability. Using this information, we can predict that a particular 
customer, who has bought that shampoo has a certain probability of going on to buy 
the hairbrush. The supermarket may then decide to market this brush to them, for 
example by showing them adverts when they shop online. For the purposes of the 
following discussion, the following definitions will be helpful: 
 
Prediction: That person P, who has bought Shampoo X, is likely to buy 
Hairbrush Y. 
Generalisation: People who buy Shampoo X, buy Hairbrush Y with probability 
a. 
Population data set: All customers of the supermarket. 
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Reference class: Customers buying Shampoo X. 
Target class: Customers buying Hairbrush Y. 
 
 Person P is in the population data set. The prediction about their future 
purchase (membership of the target class) is based on their membership of the 
reference class, and the generalisation about the behaviour of other people in that 
reference class. This is the same form of argument in the cases above. In the 
criminality example the prediction of future criminals is based on their membership of 
a reference class of people who committed crimes, along with a generalisation that 
people with these characteristics commit crimes. In the juvenile intervention 
example, the prediction about which juvenile intervention will work for a particular 
young offender is based on their membership of a reference class for whom this 
intervention worked (or worked better than other alternatives) in the past. In the 
second example, the prediction about future health conditions in based on that 
individual’s membership of a reference class of other similar patients, and the health 
conditions that they went on to suffer. In the third example, the prediction of an 
individual’s income level is based on their membership of a reference class of other 
individuals liking similar topics, and making similar comments, on Facebook.  
This form of reasoning is analysed in the literature on legal evidence. The 
following section reviews this, before arguing that the ethical restrictions on using 
such reasoning are applicable to the big data cases. 
 
   
Legal principles and generalisations 
 
Dahlman argues that arguments about legal evidence often rely on generalisations, 
only some of which are acceptable. An argument about legal evidence points to this 
evidence and suggests that it increases the probability of a certain hypothesis, 
usually the guilt or innocence of the defendant. For example, the defendant is 
recorded on CCTV close to the scene of the crime. This increases the probability 
that the defendant is guilty. This argument depends on a generalisation that links the 
evidence with the hypothesis. In this case, the generalisation that people close to the 
crime scene are more likely to have committed the crime. Dahlman refers to a 
reference class and a target class, in the same way as the example above.  
As we shall see, a generalization connects two classes to each other. I will refer to 
these classes as the ‘‘reference class’’ and the ‘‘target class’’. When an argument on 
legal evidence points to a certain piece of evidence, it classifies the case at hand as 
belonging to the reference class of cases where this kind of evidence is present, and 
when the argument claims that the evidence increases the probability of a certain 
hypothesis, it claims that membership in the reference class increases the probability 
that the case belongs to the target class of cases where the hypothesis is true. 
(2017, pg. 84) 
 Dahlman then considers what it is about these generalisations that make 
them unacceptable, and what it is that distinguishes them from acceptable 
generalisations. He provides a checklist of “critical questions” (pg. 98) that help to 
make this distinction. 
 
1. Is the generalisation empirically true, or false, as a generalisation? 
Is membership in the target class more common in the reference class than 
among cases in general? 
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2. Is the generalisation sufficiently robust? 
Is the reference class homogenous or heterogeneous? 
3. Does the generalisation trigger bias? 
Is there a risk that the generalisation, if accepted, will be overused, or 
overestimated? 
4. Is the generalisation discriminating? 
Does the generalisation put people in the reference class at an unfair 
disadvantage? (2017, pg. 98) 
 
 
Is the generalisation true? 
 
Consider the following case: A witness in a burglary case testifies that they saw a 
man loading boxes into a van. However, it was night-time so he couldn’t identify the 
man, but thought the van was blue. In his summing up, the defence attorney says 
that it is common knowledge that colours are easily mistaken in the dark. Blue might 
easily be mistaken for green, and vice versa. The witness might therefore be 
mistaken. Dhalman notes that this sort of generalisation is usually acceptable.  
The generalisation in question is: “the probability that an observation is 
mistaken, given the information that it was made in the dark, is higher than the 
probability that it was mistaken, given that we are ignorant about the light conditions 
when the observation was made. For this to be true membership in the target class 
must be more likely in the reference class than in cases in general.” (2017, pg. 89. 
Italics in original). In judging the truth of this generalisation it is not sufficient that the 
observation was made in the dark, it must be true that mistakes are more common 
when made in the dark, than when we do not know the lighting conditions. This is 
because some observations will be mistaken, regardless of light conditions. For this 
generalisation to be true, errors need to be more common in the dark. To generalise 
this point, it is not sufficient that membership of the target class is common in the 
reference class, it must be more common in the reference class than in the 
population in general. This generalisation is therefore relatively unproblematic 
because mistakes about colour are more common in the dark. 
  
 
Is the generalisation robust? 
 
Consider the following case: A man is standing trial for the murder of his neighbour 
with a shotgun. The man claims that his wife shot the neighbour. The prosecutor 
argues that, because only 8% of homicide offenders are women, it is probable that 
the man killed the neighbour, rather than the woman. 
This argument relies on the generalisation that it is more probable that 
defendant is guilty if they are a man. Dahlman notes that this is correct, statistically 
speaking. However, this generalisation is concerning, despite being true. Essentially, 
this particular man is being judged on the basis of his membership of a group- being 
a man. Suppose that the defendant has a track record as a peaceful and law-abiding 
citizen. In this case it is more unacceptable to judge him on the basis of being a man, 
than on the basis of being a man, with a peaceful and law-abiding history. This is 
because, Dahlman argues, ‘being a man; is a more heterogeneous reference class 
than ‘being a man with a peaceful and law-abiding track record’. There is more 
variability in the group, ‘men’, than in the group ‘men with a peaceful and law-abiding 
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history’. A generalisation is more robust, and more acceptable, when the reference 
class is more specific. In this case, it is unacceptable to use this generalisation 
because ‘being a man’ is too heterogeneous a reference class to be relevant in this 
case. 
 
 
Does the generalisation trigger bias? 
 
In some situations we might be reluctant to accept a generalisation despite its truth 
and robustness because it has the potential to bias. Consider the following case: A 
man of Somali origin is standing trial for shoplifting. The prosecutor uses crime 
statistics showing that convictions for shoplifting are more common among people of 
Somali origin than for the population in general to argue that, although these 
statistics do not mean this particular man committed this offence, they do increase 
the probability that he did. 
 The worry with this generalisation is that it will be overestimated, or over-
used. Dahlman notes that data showing that shoplifting convictions are higher for 
men of Somali origin than for men of other ethnic origins does not mean that men of 
Somali origin are overrepresented among guilty defendants. Their higher 
representation among those convicted for shoplifting could be due to bias against 
them in the legal system. Using this generalisation could perpetuate and exacerbate 
any existing bias, and might even legitimise racism in the population. Furthermore, it 
is difficult to judge the extent to which such statistics, even if true and not attributable 
to bias, increase the probability that this particular defendant is guilty. There is a risk 
that this generalisation will trigger bias against the man on trial. 
 
 
Is the generalisation discriminating? 
 
This is an additional worry with the Somali example, because it discriminates against 
people from a particular ethnic origin. Accepting this generalisation has potentially 
large negative effect for other people from a Somali background. Dahlman says that 
they may be “systematic disadvantage” (2017, pg. 97). Dahlman notes that many 
generalisations can be discriminating. Consider the case where a mother provides 
her son an alibi. The prosecution might argue that mothers are unreliable providers 
of alibis because they are likely to lie to protect their children, particularly if their 
children are on trial for serious crimes. The generalisation that mothers are likely to 
lie to protect their children is discriminating against mothers, if it is accepted. 
However, Dahlman argues that it is less discriminating because the negative 
repercussions for mothers are less than the negative repercussions for people of 
Somali origin. Mothers providing truthful alibis for their children (and those children) 
may well rankle at this suggestion. However, Dahlman is correct to note that when 
generalisations discriminate, the seriousness of this discrimination must be weighed 
against the evidential value they provide. The generalisation about Somali origin is 
discriminating, and therefore unacceptable. 
Dahlman does not delineate the difference between bias and discrimination in 
quite these terms, but in the following discussion bias will refer to negative effects on 
individuals, while discrimination refers to wider effects on other people classified as 
belonging to the same group. We can therefore distinguish between bias and 
overuse against an individual, and wider discrimination against a group of people. 
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Summary 
 
Dahlman provides criteria that help to decide whether generalisations are 
acceptable, or unacceptable. These work relatively well for his legal examples. The 
following section applies them to the big data examples introduced at the beginning 
of this paper. It shows that these criteria are transferable to the big data cases.  
 
 
How do these apply to the big data examples? 
 
 
Example 1: Predicting criminals. 
 
Is the generalisation true? 
This example is hypothetical, so the truth of the generalisation is difficult to judge. 
However, there is a clear problem with this case. This is because what we really 
want to know is whether membership of the target class is higher in the reference 
class than in the population in general. However, not all crimes are discovered, 
reported, or recorded. Particularly for less serious crimes, we do not know the extent 
of criminality in the population at large. This makes generalisations linking reference 
classes with target classes problematic. Any statistical relationship between the 
reference and target classes is likely to be untrue because we will not be sure that 
membership of the target class is higher in the reference class than in the population 
in general. An additional worry is the incidence of false convictions. Any statistical 
relationships based on characteristics shared by convicted criminals will include the 
characteristics of wrongly convicted individuals. By its very nature, the incidence of 
false convictions is difficult to judge. 
Furthermore, in this case, we also need to know how many convicted 
criminals do not have the characteristics defining the reference class. What 
percentage of criminals share characteristics with the reference class? Barocas et al. 
(2016) discuss this problem in the context of employment practices. Obtaining data 
with sufficient granularity can be expensive, and sometimes does not exist. They 
note that “Obtaining information that is sufficiently rich to permit precise distinctions 
can be expensive. Even marginal improvements in accuracy may come at significant 
practical costs and may justify a less granular and encompassing analysis.” (2016, 
pg. 689). There may simply be insufficient data to be able to understand the extent to 
which the target and reference classes match. 
Finally, a system that finds correlations in data will often not find causal 
relationships. However, if we want to use correlations to make predictions about 
people causation is relevant, and makes a difference to the acceptability of these 
generalisations. For example, if the relationship between age and criminal 
convictions in causal, rather than just a correlation, it may be more ethically 
permissible to use it.  
 
Is the generalisation robust? 
The reference class is robust to the extent that it is less heterogeneous. However, 
the issue is not just about the degree of heterogeneity per se, but what this 
heterogeneity is about. For example, it makes little difference to the robustness of 
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the generalisation whether the reference class is heterogeneous because it includes 
characteristics such as, a low income, poor educational attainment, liking black 
trainers, eating at McDonald’s, and watching American Idol. To be judged more 
heterogeneous, the characteristics present in the target and reference class must be 
‘relevant’. Judging relevancy is difficult, but this can also be seen as an issue of 
distinguishing causally relevant factors from correlational ones.  
 
Does the generalisation trigger bias? 
This generalisation has potential to trigger bias, both because people in the 
reference class may be judged more likely to commit crimes than they really are. 
Additionally, Anderson (2012), in his discussion of character evidence in trials, 
highlights a risk that individuals are convicted on the basis of the sort of person they 
are, rather than because of what they did. This worry is relevant here because juries, 
judges, and the police may become biased against people ‘of a certain kind’ because 
of the perceived connection between certain characteristics and criminality. 
 
Is the generalisation discriminating? 
Anyone in the reference class is open to discrimination, from other members of the 
public, and from the police. People in this group might be arrested speculatively, and 
might suffer discrimination in job applications. Barocas and Selbst (2016) raise a 
wider worry about discrimination that can arise in cases like this. They note that not 
all data is collected ‘equally’. Certain citizens, or neighbourhoods are often 
overlooked (2016, pg. 684). They write that this can arise due to lack of access to 
technology, through which data is often collected, or because people do not 
participate in the formal economy. They illustrate this with an example about pothole 
monitoring. In Boston, potholes could be automatically reported through a 
smartphone app which detected when a car drove over a pothole. Given the 
differential rates of smartphone ownership, this reporting mechanism is biased 
towards those in affluent neighbourhoods. This could also be a problem in the 
predictive policing example. There may be differential rates of crime reporting, or 
recording, or even in conviction rates for crimes in different areas. Even if the 
generalisations use were true, and robust, the underlying data may not accurately 
reflect the real distribution of crime across different neighbourhoods. In an extreme 
case, the data might be used to predict people likely to commit crimes in affluent 
neighbourhoods, rather than all neighbourhoods.  
 
Summary 
Predicting future criminals using big data is unethical on each of the criteria above. 
The generalisation isn’t true because we are unlikely to have complete population 
data to use for analysis. The population data is likely to be more reliable for serious 
crimes, such as murder, but not even all murders are discovered, or reported. 
Additionally, not all those convicted are guilty. These issues make it difficult to 
specify the reference class correctly. This generalisation may not be robust, and 
raises significant concerns about bias and discrimination. It is therefore 
unacceptable. It is important to think about the data that we want—the incidence of 
criminality in the population at large, not just the data that we can get. An awareness 
of the limitations of the data should encourage an appreciation of the limitations, and 
possible unreliability, of generalisations. 
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Example 2: Juvenile reoffending 
 
Is the generalisation true?  
The research underlying this case has not been scientifically validated, however, the 
initial evidence is that it is true. The worry about reference classes is not so 
important in this case. The population is juvenile offenders. The reference class is 
juvenile offenders who have had access to a number of different interventions, and 
the target class is juvenile offenders who share various characteristics with offenders 
in the reference class. What we need to know, in this case, is not only that juvenile 
offenders with a certain group of characteristics have responded well to a particular 
intervention, but that they have done better than juvenile offenders in general. The 
research does not show this, but does show a reduction in reoffending levels. In 
advance of knowing this, is it unclear whether this generalisation is true, in 
Dahlman’s sense.  
 
Is the generalisation robust? 
The reference classes may be more, or less robust. In principle, it is possible to 
refine them so that they are less heterogeneous. However, decisions about how 
much data to collect may affect the degree of homogeneity of reference classes, and 
should be considered an ethical decision. Zook et al. (2017) propose 10 guidelines 
for ethical ‘big data’ research. The first four focus on privacy and the use of 
seemingly innocuous data that can be used to discriminate against people. The fifth 
encourages researchers to “Consider the strengths and limitations of your data” 
(2017, pg. 4). They write that the context within which data is gathered is important 
for the interpretation of that data. Rather than suggesting clear conclusions, data is 
often unclear, and subject to interpretations. This is particularly important, in the 
current example; young offenders may be classified in ways that miss unique factors 
that may affect their rehabilitation. For example, a number of juvenile criminals could 
belong to a gang, but this may be for very different reasons. For some youths the 
gang may be a surrogate family and provide social support which is lacking 
elsewhere in their lives. For others the gang may facilitate criminal behaviour they 
were engaging in before they joined the gang. Classifying them all as ‘gang 
members’ does highlight a feature they have in common, but may disguise a great 
deal of heterogeneity that could be relevant for their rehabilitation. The robustness of 
the generalisation therefore needs to be carefully considered. 
 
Does the generalisation trigger bias? 
There is some potential to trigger bias if some juvenile offenders are categorised as 
particularly troublesome, or problematic. Additionally, some bias might be triggered if 
some offenders are judged ‘not capable’ of participating in educational interventions. 
However, these concerns deal with the implementation of the interventions, and the 
way in which the reoffending interventions are managed, rather than with the 
generalisation itself. 
 
Is the generalisation discriminating? 
The population of juvenile offenders is, presumably, already at a disadvantage 
because they have committed crimes. If the programs limit reoffending then this has 
the potential to reduce discrimination. If the wider population learns that young 
offenders can move on to live fulfilling lives after such interventions then this 
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generalisation has the potential to reduce discrimination. This might particularly be 
the case in employment situations. 
 
Summary 
The data is being used to allocate juvenile offenders to a variety of positive 
interventions. The case would be very different were it used to decide which 
juveniles should have access to these interventions at all. As such, this use of big 
data to make predictions about individuals is potentially acceptable. However, it is 
important to ensure that juvenile offenders do not experience any bias in the 
allocation to one scheme rather than another. It is also important to consider the 
extent to which the generalisation is robust.  
 
 
Example 3: Health conditions 
 
Is the generalisation true?  
The relationships discovered in the cited study appear relatively significant. 
However, the issues discussed here also relate to a more general ‘prediction of 
disease’ framework. The truth of such generalisations depends on knowing the 
incidence of particular diseases in the wider population, which depends in turn on the 
accuracy of detection and diagnosis at a population level. Char et al. (2018) provide 
a number of examples of ‘missing’ data in health care datasets. This includes cases 
where few studies have been done in certain populations; they write, “Attempts to 
use data from the Framingham Heart Study to predict the risk of cardiovascular 
events in non-white patients have led to biased results” (2018, pg.1). A different 
problem resulting from missing data is found in big data analysis of mental health. 
Chancellor et al. (2019) describe how social media posts have been used to predict 
which users are suffering from depression, and other mental health issues. The 
dataset used was from people who had already disclosed a mental health condition 
on social media (a post saying ‘I’ve been diagnosed with depression’ for example). 
Matching the characteristics of these people to potential sufferers from depression 
misses the fact that the sample of people suffering from depression who are 
comfortable disclosing this on social media is a subset of those with depression. 
Predicting depression based on the characteristics of this subset is likely to miss a 
large number of relevant people. (Chancellor et al. discuss other worries with using 
this data that question whether it is ethically permissible for other reasons). The truth 
of these sorts of generalisations needs to be carefully considered to understand 
whether the data available is characteristic of the population, the reference class, 
and the target class researchers would like to know about.  
 
Is the generalisation sufficiently robust?  
It is likely that the range of factors that might be relevant to the incidence of disease 
is more restricted than in the criminality example. These sorts of data sets have the 
potential to be more robust, but this will vary for different health conditions. 
 
Does the generalisation trigger bias?  
Generalisations of this sort could easily trigger bias, if treatment is affected, or if 
insurance premiums are raised for specific individuals. For example, treatment might 
be rationed away from patients expected to suffer from additional health conditions in 
the future, and insurers might raise premiums for patients judged at high risk of 
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future health conditions. Furthermore, suppose that a patient is instructed to change 
their lifestyle, such as taking more exercise or making dietary changes to reduce 
their chances of suffering from a medical condition. If they then still suffer from the 
medical condition a few years later, there is a risk that they will suffer negative bias 
from the medical community, or from the wider community, as they are seen as 
bringing about their own decline. 
 
Is the generalisation discriminating? 
Some medical conditions may be causally related to living in poverty, lifestyle, or 
genetic factors. There is the potential for people from such wider groups to be 
discriminated against by the medical profession, the wider community, and 
employers. There is also a risk that insurance companies charge these communities 
higher premia, or become reluctant to ensure them, even if they are disease free at 
the time a policy is taken out.  
 
Summary 
The purpose of these predictions about individuals is to reduce the incidence of 
disease, and to help people by intervening before they develop serious health 
conditions. This is an ethically praiseworthy desire. The positive aspects of these 
predictions need to be isolated from the possible negative consequences. In cases 
like this, implementation and management is critical. Perhaps, patients should be 
required to opt-in to predictive programmes, and data privacy would be especially 
important is such cases. Additionally, the predictive policing and medical examples 
suggest that decisions about whether to think about causation is an ethical one. For 
example, if lifestyle factors are judged predictive of future health conditions, and the 
treatment of patients is affected by these lifestyle choices it is relevant to know 
whether these are causal, or merely correlational. Zwitter et al. (2014) note that the 
more data we have, the more likely it is that random commonalities will be found. 
They write that “in fact, no connectedness at all would be the outlier.” (2014, pg. 5). 
On a purely pragmatic level, correlational relationships may be less likely to persist 
than causal ones. Johnson (2014) provides a relatively benign example. A US 
college discovered a relationship between first day login and online course success. 
The college assumed this relationship was causal and encouraged students to log in 
on the first day, expecting that this would increase their success on the course. It 
had no effect. Although the intervention did no harm, resources could have been 
used more productively. Distinguishing causation from correlation is important when 
attempting interventions that may affect people’s health. Additionally, the availability 
of data may affect the truth of these sorts of generalisations.  
 
 
Example 4: Income levels 
 
Is the generalisation true?  
This example can be generalised to cover many different sorts of predictions based 
on social media use. The population data set in these sorts of cases is all users of 
certain social media, in this example Facebook. The reference class is people with 
various levels of income matched with various characteristics on social media. The 
target class is people who share those social media characteristics, and whose 
income is then predicted. These generalisations will be true if membership of a target 
class specifying a particular level of income is higher in the reference class than in 
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the population in general. As suggested by the research into income levels, these 
generalisations are more likely to be true at extremes- very high and low income 
levels, than for a wide range of average income levels.  
 
Is the generalisation sufficiently robust?  
The generalisation could be very robust if users reveal a lot of information on social 
media, which would allow for the construction of accurately specified reference 
classes. However, there are reasons to worry about the robustness of these sorts of 
datasets. For example, Zook et al. (2017) ask, “Are your findings as clear-cut if your 
interpretation of a social media posting switches from a recording of fact to the 
performance of a social identity?...it is fundamental that researchers be sensitive to 
the potential multiple meanings of data.” (2017, pg. 11). They go on to note that a 
Facebook post could be interpreted as approval or disapproval of something, a 
simple observation, or an attempt to improve social status. Attending to these 
nuances affects the hypotheses considered, as well as the conclusions drawn from 
analysis. Data sets may be more heterogeneous than they appear. For example, a 
number of people may ‘like’ the same status updates, but for different reasons 
entirely. Seeing this group as similar with regards to this status update may therefore 
be misleading. The social media example is therefore more problematic than it at 
first appears.  
 
Does the generalisation trigger bias?  
These generalisations could trigger bias if the information is used to deny credit, or 
raise interest rates on debt, or to market questionable products to individuals. For 
example, very low income social media users could be shown adverts for poor 
quality rental properties, rather than higher quality ones they are judged (not 
necessarily accurately) unable to afford. High income users could be targeted by 
companies charging more for services that are available at a lower cost elsewhere, 
because they are judged able to afford it. There is a clear potential for bias against 
these groups. 
 
Is the generalisation discriminating?  
This generalisation could be discriminating. The study cited above noted that both 
the subject of ‘likes’ and the language used are indicative of income level. Were 
these generalisations to be come widely known, the use of particular language, or 
personal preferences might become correlated with characteristics such as ‘being 
poor’. This could lead to discrimination against people because of the things they 
say, or write, in the real world.  
 
Summary 
Generalisations of this sort may well be true, however there may be significant 
issues with robustness because people may be doing different things with a social 
media post. A ‘like’ could be indicative of a variety of different things; approval, an 
expression of solidarity with friends, or an expression of an online identity. 
Generalisations may also lead to bias and discrimination.  
 
 
Conclusion 
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Dahlman’s criteria allow us to raise a number of concerns with these big data cases 
that go beyond privacy. Bias and discrimination are relatively easy to appreciate, 
although judgements about them are sometimes arguable. This is illustrated by 
Dahlman’s reduced concern about discriminatory generalisations about alibi 
providing mothers than about people of Somali origin. Dahlman’s criteria are useful 
for highlighting additional ethical concerns that may preclude the use of some 
generalisations even before we consider bias and discrimination. These are 
concerns about the data researchers use in their analysis. If acceptable 
generalisations are true and robust, then these three ethical issues are involved in 
the collection and use of data too: 
Ideal vs Actual Data: When making predictions about individuals on the basis 
of big data analysis, researchers should critically assess the generalisations they are 
relying on. They should ask what data they need to assess the truth of these 
generalisations. Relying on a generalisation when there is insufficient data to know 
whether it is true is unethical. This criteria is particularly important in the predicting 
criminality and healthcare examples, where missing or unavailable data should throw 
doubt on the truth of the generalisations. 
Causation: Even if it isn’t possible to know whether relationships discovered 
through big data analysis are causal or correlational, this lack of certainly should be 
incorporated into the confidence attached to these relationships, particularly where 
potential for bias or discrimination exist. This criterion is important in the predicting 
criminality, healthcare and juvenile rehabilitation examples, where correlations may 
be discovered that are not helpful for initiating successful interventions.  
Heterogeneity: When making predictions about individuals on the basis of big 
data analysis, researchers should consider the nuances in the data they use to 
assess the extent to which people classified as being ‘the same’ really are the same. 
This is relevant in all four examples. Data may be classified in ways that are 
convenient, or easy, but this may miss nuances and differences within classifications 
that reduce the robustness of a generalisation. 
 This paper has applied Dahman’s criteria for assessing the acceptability of 
generalisations in legal arguments to predictions about individuals on the basis of big 
data analysis. It began by showing that the form the arguments take in legal and big 
data cases is the same, before applying Dahlman’s criteria to the big data cases. In 
addition to concerns about bias and discrimination, this analysis has enabled the 
formulation of three data related criteria that should be addressed when making 
predictions about individuals.  
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